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        Abstract 
Cognitive models of deception focus on the conflict-inducing nature of the truth activation 
during lying. Here we tested the counterintuitive hypothesis that the truth can also serve a 
functional role in the act of lying. More specifically, we examined whether the construction of 
a lie can involve a two-step process, where the first step entails activating the truth, based 
upon which a lie response can be formulated in a second step. To investigate this hypothesis, 
we tried to capture the covert truth activation in a reaction-time based deception paradigm. 
Together with each question, we presented either the truth or lie response as distractors. If 
lying depends on the covert activation of the truth, deceptive responses would thus be 
facilitated by truth distractors relative to lie distractors. Our results indeed revealed such a 
“covert congruency” effect, both in errors and reaction times (Experiment 1). Moreover, 
stimulating participants to use the distractor information by increasing the proportion of truth 
distractor trials enlarged the “covert congruency” effects, and as such confirmed that the 
effects operate at a covert response level (Experiment 2). Our findings lend support to the idea 
that lying relies on a first step of truth telling, and call for a shift in theoretical thinking that 
highlights both the functional and interfering properties of the truth activation in the lying 
process.  
 Key words: deception, cognitive processes, truth activation, distractors 
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Lying relies on the truth 
1. Introduction 
 A growing body of evidence supports the long held assumption that lying is more 
cognitively demanding than truth telling (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Behavioral research, for example, has shown that the additional 
cognitive processes involved in lying are reflected in longer latencies and a higher error rate 
compared to truth telling (see Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011, for a review). Brain imaging 
studies have also demonstrated that, in contrast to truth telling, the act of lying involves more 
activity in prefrontal brain regions (anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal, and inferior 
frontal regions) that are known to be crucially involved in cognitive control (see Abe, 2011; 
Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009, for reviews). The idea that 
cognitive control plays a key role in deception is further bolstered by studies showing that the 
ability to deceive is poor in children, whose prefrontal cortex development is not yet complete 
(Hala & Russell, 2001; Talwar & Lee, 2008), and in patients with neurodevelopmental and 
neurodegenerative conditions of the frontal lobe, such as autism and Parkinson’s disease 
(Abe, 2009).  
  Despite the increasing interest in the cognitive aspect of deception, research that has 
attempted to unravel the underlying mechanisms as to why lying is more mentally 
challenging, remains relatively limited. So far, most research favors the explanation that 
cognitive control would be needed to resolve the response conflict evoked by the automatic 
activation of the dominant truth response. Self-reports, for example, have revealed that the 
truth often first enters ones working memory before responding deceptively (Walczyk, Roper, 
Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003). Furthermore, electroencephalography (EEG) and brain 
imaging studies have pointed to the existence of response conflict and inhibition during 
deception (e.g., Christ et al., 2009; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004). Other studies provided 
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evidence for the initial truth activation when lying by tracking arm movements (Duran, Dale, 
& McNamara, 2010) or applying electromyography (EMG; Hadar, Makris, & Yarrow, 2012; 
Seymour & Schumacher, 2009) during a manual deception task. In the study of Duran and 
colleagues (2010), participants answered autobiographical yes/no questions truthfully or 
deceptively by moving a Nintendo Wii remote to a “yes” or “no” response label in each 
corner of a large screen. An analysis of the arm trajectories revealed that during deception 
there was a strong attraction toward the truthful response. Using a Concealed Information 
Test (Lykken, 1959; Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011), Seymour and Schumacher 
(2009) asked participants to categorize previously presented words and new words as “old” or 
“new” by making a left or right arm movement. To some of the previously presented words, 
participants were instructed to deceptively indicate that they were new. The crucial measure 
was the proportion of partial-error responses, that is, responses that showed EMG activity in 
the arm associated with the incorrect response prior to EMG activity in the arm associated 
with the correct response. The higher proportion of partial-error responses during deceptive 
responding versus truthful responding revealed initial truth activation during deception. 
Finally, in the study of Hadar and colleagues (2012), participants used their finger or thumb to 
respond either truthfully or deceptively with regard to facial familiarity. EMG activity, 
induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on the primary motor cortex (i.e., motor-
evoked-potentials, MEPs), served as an index of the action tendency strength. The results 
showed that during the preparation of a lie, the MEP of the digit associated with truthful 
responding became larger than the MEP of the digit linked to the deceptive response. In sum, 
the above studies lend support for the idea that the truth is covertly activated when lying. The 
truth is thereby mainly depicted as causing conflict.   
  Also contemporary cognitive models of deception have highlighted the conflict-
inducing character of the truth. The Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory 
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(Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014; see Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-
Ross, 2009; Walczyk et al., 2003, for previous versions of the model), for instance, holds that 
upon hearing a question, relevant information from long-term memory will be activated and 
transferred into working memory. Among the relevant information, the truth would receive 
the highest activation, and most often be automatically activated. Once having decided to lie, 
the model assumes that inhibition is needed to prevent the truth from slipping out. Also the 
Sheffield model (Spence et al., 2004) and the Working Model of Deception (Vendemia, 
Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005; see Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009, for an 
update) hold that generating a deceptive response requires the inhibition of the prepotent truth 
response. Finally, the Parallel Task-Set model (Seymour, 2001) serves to explain the RT 
increase for deceptive responses in the Concealed Information Test. The model departs from a 
dual-process account and states that items will automatically trigger two task-sets that run in 
parallel. Whereas one task-set would initiate a fast, automatic response based on familiarity, 
the other task-set would instigate a slower, more controlled correct response based on 
recollection. On truth trials the task-sets match, and the fast familiarity-based response can be 
executed. On deception trials the familiarity-based “old” response needs to be aborted in favor 
of the slower recollection-based “new” response. Again, the truth is argued to conflict with 
the selection of the lie response.  
  Yet, can the truth also play a more positive role in lying? A first hint in this direction 
comes from descriptions on the role of the executive functions of working memory updating 
and shifting in lying. Several authors imply that in order to produce a deceptive response, liars 
would need to keep the truth active in working memory, and be able to shift between the 
mental sets associated with these responses (Christ et al., 2009; Evans & Lee, 2013; Visu-
Petra, Varga, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2013). However, why exactly the truth would be kept 
active and be part of a shifting process during the construction of lies was left unspecified. A 
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second indication comes from a study of Walczyk et al. (2003) in which many participants 
reported using the truth in order to lie. In the case of open-ended questions, 70 % of the 
participants indicated that the truth was used to cue information with which to create the lie. 
When asked yes/no questions, 76 % of the participants stated that they applied the simple rule 
of saying the opposite of the truth. Third, the closer liars stick to the truth, the harder it is to 
detect deception (Hershkowitz, 2001; Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010). Fourth, the models 
described above allow room for our counterintuitive idea that the truth can be functional in the 
lying process. The Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory, for example, argues that 
the truth prompts a network of semantic and episodic nodes in long-term memory, which can 
be accessed to construct a lie (Walczyk et al., 2014). Furthermore, the Working Model of 
Deception states that lying involves the process required for truth telling (Vendemia, Buzan, 
& Simon-Dack, 2005). These considerations point to the possibility that the truth may initially 
be functional in constructing the lie via a two-step process, in which in a first step the truth is 
activated, based upon which an alternative (i.e., deceptive) response can be generated in a 
second step.
1
 Such a hypothesis not only provides new insight into the nature of lying, but can 
also explain why lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth: Lying involves 
truth telling plus a second process. Lying is thus cognitively more demanding than truth 
telling to the extent that the second process requires cognitive resources.   
  Until now, the evidence for a two-step process is limited. Given that the validity of 
subjective verbal reports about mental processes can be questioned (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977; Pronin, 2009; Wilson, 2002), the introspective reports in the study of Walczyk et al. 
(2003) may only have reflected what people think about how they generate lies, not how they 
actually generate lies. Therefore, we report two experiments in which we used a reaction-time 
paradigm to obtain direct support for a two-step process in the act of lying, in which the lie 
response is created via a first step of truth activation. The basic logic behind the task was that 
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if lying depends on a first step of truth telling, then stimuli that help or hinder truth telling 
might have the same effect on lying.   
  In our experiments, participants performed the Sheffield lie test (Spence et al., 2001), a 
deception paradigm in which participants answer simple yes/no questions (e.g., “Are you in 
Belgium?”) as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing a “yes” or “no” response key. 
Critically, a cue instructs participants to lie or tell the truth. For instance, the color of the 
response labels may be used to signal lying versus truth telling. Typically, reliable lie effects 
in reaction times and errors are obtained in this paradigm (i.e., longer reaction times and more 
errors on lie trials than on truth trials; e.g., Spence & Kaylor-Hughes, 2008; Verschuere, 
Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011).   
  To investigate the two-step hypothesis of lying, we applied a manipulation that was 
inspired by a paper of Seymour (1977), in which the processes underlying Stroop-like 
congruency effects were examined. In his first experiment, colored season names served as 
stimuli. The ink colors used were those that are typically associated with the seasons (i.e., 
green for spring, yellow for summer, brown for autumn, and white for winter). One group of 
participants was instructed to name the season opposite to the one related to the printed ink 
color. When, for instance, the season name was printed in yellow, the season opposite to 
summer (i.e., winter) had to be said out loud. However, because word reading is more 
dominant than color naming (MacLeod, 1991), the presented task-irrelevant season names 
were expected to affect responding. Surprisingly, facilitation occurred when the season 
matched the printed ink color and therefore differed from the to-be-emitted response. For 
example, it was easier to respond “winter” when “SUMMER” was presented in yellow, than 
when “WINTER” was presented in yellow. This finding is suggestive for a two-step process 
underlying opposite season naming, where first the season associated with the ink color is 
covertly activated (e.g., summer when the color is yellow), based upon which the opposite 
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season is then formulated (i.e., winter). When the presented season and color match, the 
season is congruent with the covert response of the first step. As a result, the opposite season 
can be easily deduced in a second step. When conversely, the color and season do not match, 
the season is incongruent with the required covert response. This gives rise to a covert conflict 
at the first stage that leads to a delay in overt responding.  
  If lying in our Sheffield lie test first requires the covert activation of the truth, a similar 
scenario as in the opposite naming task was expected to unfold. More specifically, we 
anticipated lying to be easier in a context that should facilitate the covert truth activation, 
compared to a context that should interfere with this activation. To test this prediction, we 
presented distractors that flanked the questions in the Sheffield lie test. The distractors 
represented either the truth or lie response to these questions (or were neutral symbols). Even 
though the distractors were task-irrelevant, we expected that they would bias responding 
because they overlapped with the task-relevant responses (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 
1990). Based on the assumption that lie construction may involve a two-step process, we 
expected to observe an effect of covert congruency in reaction times and errors. Truth 
distractors would be congruent with the covert truth response that is required in the first step 
of lie construction, whereas lie distractors would be incongruent with the truth response. 
Hence, relative to lie distractors, truth distractors should facilitate truth activation. If lying 
depends on this initial truth activation, then also lying should therefore be facilitated with 
truth distractors relative to lie distractors. In sum, according to the two-step assumption, lying 
should paradoxically be faster and more accurate in the presence of truth distractors than in 
the presence of lie distractors.  
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2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method  
  2.1.1. Participants. Twenty-six undergraduate students at Ghent University (2 men, 
Mage = 20.85 years, SD = 1.83) participated in exchange for €4. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.   
  2.1.2. Apparatus. The Sheffield lie test was presented on a Pentium IV personal 
computer with a 17-inch color monitor running Tscope (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006). Participants sat approximately 50 centimeters from the computer 
screen.   
2.2. Procedure  
  The experiment was run in a dimly lit room. After giving informed consent, 
participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire that consisted of the 20 Dutch yes/no 
questions that would be used in the Sheffield lie test (see Appendix A). The questions started 
with “Are you (a)”. Half of the questions could be answered by a truthful “yes” response (e.g., 
“Are you a student?”), whereas the other half required a truthful “no” response (e.g., “Are you 
outside?”). The response options were yes, no, or unsure. In case of an “unsure” response  
(< 1 %) or an unexpected response (e.g., “no” to “Are you an adult?”; < 1 %), the 
experimenter discussed with the participants their response choice. This helped participants to 
choose or change the truthful response they would use in the Sheffield lie test. The behavioral 
responses to these questions in the Sheffield lie test were nevertheless excluded from further 
analyses (1.92 % data loss).     
  The instructions of the Sheffield lie test stressed both speed and accuracy. Participants 
were told that the distractors should be ignored. Nevertheless, we presented the distractors in 
such a way that they were difficult to ignore. More specifically, we divided the questions into 
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two parts. The fixed part “Are you (a)” was presented in white on top of a black screen and 
remained there throughout the test (see Figure 1; Note that we provide the English translation 
here, whereas we used the Dutch phrasing, i.e., “Ben je (een)”, with the “JA” and “NEEN” 
response labels). Also the response labels “YES” and “NO” were consistently presented 
according to the response mapping (counterbalanced across participants) in white on the 
bottom of the screen. Each trial started with a 1 s presentation of these fixed features. Next, a 
fixation cross appeared that remained in the middle of the screen for 200 ms. Following 
another fixed features screen that lasted 300 ms, the crucial word of the question was 
presented (Arial, 34). To avoid that participants could ignore the distractors by focusing on a 
fixed position, the target words were presented randomly on one of four vertically centered 
positions on the screen (-5, -2, 2, or 5 cm from the middle of the screen). Below and above the 
crucial word, identical distractors were presented (Arial, 34). The vertical distance between 
the center of the crucial word and the center of the distractors was 1.0 cm, subtending 1.15 
visual angle from a viewing distance of 50 cm. The distractors could be the words “YES”, 
“NO”, or the neutral hatch signs “##”or “###”. Depending on the question, the “YES” and 
“NO” distractors represented the truth or lie response. To further enhance processing of the 
distractors, we colored the target words instead of the response labels to instruct participants 
about whether to lie or tell the truth. According to the color rule, which was counterbalanced 
across participants, one color (e.g., blue) indicated to lie, whereas the other color (e.g., 
yellow) designated to tell the truth. Distractors were presented in a white color. Participants 
responded “yes” or “no” by pressing the “4” or “6” key on the numeric pad of an AZERTY 
keyboard. After a response, or if no response was given within 3 s after the word presentation, 
the next trial was presented. At the start of the test, participants performed two practice 
phases: In the first phase, 12 trials were presented without distractors; in the second phase, 
participants performed 24 trials in which distractors were presented. Next, 480 test trials were 
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presented that were generated according to a 20 (Question) x 2 (Task [Truth vs. Lie]) x 3 
(Distractor [Neutral distractor, Truth distractor, Lie distractor]) design. A self-paced break 
was provided in the middle of the task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow of a trial in the Sheffield lie test.   
 
 
2.3. Results   
  We present two result sections. In the first section, we focus on the crucial comparison 
of truth and lie distractor trials. Both error rates and reaction times were submitted to a 
Deception (Truth vs. Lie) x Distractor (Truth distractor vs. Lie distractor) repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The second section focuses on analyses including neutral 
distractor trials. We added neutral distractor trials to our design for an exploratory purpose, 
that is, to see how facilitating or interfering the lie and truth distractors were compared to 
baseline. Accordingly, we compared neutral distractor trials with truth and lie distractor trials 
by means of Deception (Truth vs. Lie) x Distractor (Neutral distractor vs. Truth distractor vs. 
Lie distractor) ANOVAs on error rates and reaction times. We must note, however, that what 
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is the most appropriate neutral baseline has been subject to debate in psycholinguistic research 
(Jonides & Mack, 1984; Neely, 1991). Neutral trials may have unknown properties that render 
them dubious as baseline. Also with regard to our experiment, it seems reasonable to argue 
that the neutral and informative distractors may differ in the levels of alertness they evoke, 
and in their need for processing capacity. The lie and truth distractors may induce more 
relevance-orienting than the neutral distractors as they are linked to the task-relevant 
responses (Klein, 1964). Furthermore, the truth and lie distractors are meaningful words, 
which puts a higher load on linguistic and semantic processes than the meaningless string of 
neutral hatch signs (Klein, 1964). If neutral distractors were therefore processed more easily, 
facilitation effects may be underestimated and interference effects overestimated. The 
analyses should therefore be interpreted with caution.     
  Trials without response within the 3 s deadline (1.37 %) and trials with latencies 
below 300 ms (0.34 %) were discarded. For reaction time analyses, we excluded trials with 
errors (10.48 %), and truth and lie trials with reaction times that were 2.5 standard deviations 
(SDs) removed from each participant’s mean reaction time on truth and lie trials, respectively  
(2.08 %). For ANOVAs, we calculated Cohen’s effect size f using the following formula: f = 
√[η2p/(1 – η
2
p)]. Cohen (1992) considered fs of 0.10, 0.25, and 0.40, to constitute small, 
medium, and large effects, respectively. For t-tests, we used Cohen’s d as an effect size, with 
d values of 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 respectively representing small, medium, and large effects 
(Cohen, 1988). Mean error rates and reaction times per trial type are presented in Table 1. 
  2.3.1. Truth distractor trials versus lie distractor trials  
  2.3.1.1. Errors. The analysis revealed main effects of Deception, F(1, 25) = 35.19, p < 
.001, f = 1.19, and Distractor, F(1, 25) = 10.67, p < .01, f = 0.65. However, these effects were 
subsumed under a significant Deception by Distractor interaction, F(1, 25) = 7.95, p < .01, f = 
0.56. Follow-up t-tests indicated that there was a significant distractor effect on lie trials, 
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showing that lying was more error-prone in the presence of lie distractors than in the presence 
of truth distractors, t(25) = 3.73, p < .01, d = 0.73. On truth trials, numerically, also truth 
telling was more error-prone with lie distractors than with truth distractors, but this difference 
was not significant, t(25) = 1.66, p = .11, d = 0.32. We also analyzed this interaction from the 
perspective of the lie effect, that is, the difference in error rates between lying and truth 
telling. From this perspective, the lie effect (i.e., ErrorsLIE minus ErrorsTRUTH) was significant 
on both distractor type trials, ps < .001, but was larger on lie distractor trials than on truth 
distractor trials.  
  2.3.1.2. Reaction times. The main effect of Deception, F(1, 25) = 93.52, p < .001, f = 
1.94, and Distractor, F(1, 25) = 30.02, p < .001, f = 1.10, were subsumed under a marginally 
significant Deception by Distractor interaction, F(1, 25) = 4.19, p = .05, f = 0.41. The 
distractor effect was somewhat larger on trials on which participants told the truth, t(25) = 
5.05, p < .001, d = 1.00, than on which they lied, t(25) = 2.29, p = .03, d = 0.45. This resulted 
in a larger lie effect (i.e., RTLIE minus RTTRUTH) on truth distractor trials than on lie distractor 
trials (though both were significantly different from zero, ps < .001).  
  2.3.2. Truth and lie distractor trials versus neutral distractor trials  
  2.3.2.1. Errors. The analysis revealed main effects of Deception, F(1, 25) = 47.85, p < 
. 001, f = 1.38, and Distractor, F(2, 50) = 7.46, p < .01, f = 0.55. However, these effects were 
subsumed under a significant Deception by Distractor interaction, F(2, 50) = 3.63, p = .03, f = 
0.38. Therefore, two follow-up ANOVAs were conducted, in which neutral distractor trials 
were compared to truth and lie distractor trials, separately. The follow-up ANOVA that 
compared neutral and truth distractor trials showed a significant main effect of Deception, 
F(1, 25) = 41.06, p < .001, f = 1.28, and a trend toward a Deception by Distractor interaction, 
F(1, 25) = 3.47, p = .07, f = 0.37. Follow-up t-tests revealed that only on lie trials a trend 
toward a difference between distractor types emerged, showing less errors on truth distractor 
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trials than on neutral distractor trials, t(25) = 1.75, p = .09, d = 0.34. No difference was found 
on truth trials, t < 1. The follow-up ANOVA that compared neutral and lie distractor trials 
yielded a main effect of Deception, F(1, 25) = 42.59, p < .001, f = 1.30, as well as a main 
effect of Distractor, F(1, 25) = 7.89, p = .01, f = 0.56, revealing more errors on lie distractor 
trials (M = 12.55 %, SD = 6.24) than on neutral distractor trials (M = 10.63 %, SD = 6.24). 
The Deception by Distractor interaction did not reach significance, F < 1.   
  2.3.2.2. Reaction times. The ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of Deception, F(1, 
25) = 91.58, p < .001, f = 1.92. Also the main effect of Distractor proved significant, F(2, 50) 
= 27.81, p < .001, f = 1.06. Follow-up t-tests showed that response times on neutral distractor 
trials (M = 1168 ms, SD = 218) were faster than on truth distractor trials (M = 1189 ms, SD = 
230), t(25) = 2.65, p = .01, d = 0.51, and lie distractor trials (M = 1225 ms, SD = 239), t(25) = 
6.50, p < .001, d = 1.27. The Deception by Distractor interaction remained non-significant, 
F(2, 50) = 1.63, p = .21. 
Table 1  
Mean error rates and reaction times in the Sheffield lie test of Experiment 1  
 
 
 
a,b,c
 Different letters in the same row indicate that the values are significantly different (p < .05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Neutral distractor  
M (SD) 
Truth distractor (TD) 
M (SD) 
Lie distractor (LD) 
M (SD) 
 
Distractor effect 
 (LD – TD) 
M (SD) 
Error rates (%)     
     Truth telling 8.00 (6.92) a 8.12 (6.95) a,b 9.55 (6.18) b 1.43 (4.41) 
     Lying 13.25 (6.51) a 11.19 (7.55) a 15.56 (7.43) b 4.37 (5.98) 
     Lie effect (lie – truth) 5.25 (5.10) a 3.07 (3.72) a,b 6.01 (5.55) a,c  
Reaction times (ms)     
     Truth telling 1078 (214) a 1094 (224) b 1145 (234) c 51 (52) 
     Lying 1263 (236) a 1289 (247) b 1311 (255) c 22 (48) 
     Lie effect (lie – truth) 185 (121) a 195 (92) a,b 166 (111) a,c  
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2.4. Discussion  
  The aim of the present experiment was to test the hypothesis that constructing a lie 
involves a two-step process, in which the first step comprises the activation of the truth, so 
that based on the truth an alternative response can be generated in the second step. In a 
Sheffield lie test, participants lied or told the truth to yes/no questions that were flanked by 
distractors depicting either the truth (truth distractors) or lie response (lie distractors). Lying 
was found to be faster and more accurate in the presence of truth distractors compared to lie 
distractors. These distractor effects can be interpreted as “covert congruency” effects. The fact  
that lying was easier in the presence of truth distractors than in the presence of lie distractors 
supports the idea that lying involved a covert step that was influenced by the distractors. Our 
data are thus supportive for the existence of a two-step process in the act of lying, where the 
activation of the truth plays an essential role.  
  Although truth distractors facilitated lying relative to lie distractors, lying was slower 
on truth distractor trials than on neutral distractor trials. Hence, we cannot conclude that truth 
distractors facilitated lying relative to a neutral baseline. However, as discussed above, there 
are good reasons to believe that the distractors presented on the neutral distractor trials did not 
provide an adequate baseline. Most importantly, unlike the truth distractors, neutral distractors 
did not correspond to existing words and were not part of the set of potential responses (see 
Klein, 1964, for evidence showing that both factors influence reaction times).    
  Finally, a distractor effect was present also on trials that required a truth response. This 
distractor effect can be interpreted as an “overt congruency” effect: Whereas truth distractors 
are congruent with the to-be-emitted overt truth response, lie distractors are incongruent with 
that response. This finding confirms the idea that generating the truth is a single-step process, 
which merely requires the retrieval of the truth response.   
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3. Experiment 2 
  The goal of our second experiment was twofold. First, we wanted to explore whether 
we could replicate the distractor effects found in Experiment 1. Second, we aimed to further 
validate our explanation for the effects in terms of (covert) response congruency. We did this 
by manipulating the proportion of truth distractor trials in the Sheffield lie test. We reasoned 
that if the distractor effects are due to response congruency – and thus operate at a response 
selection level – we would find similar proportion congruency effects as seen in typical 
response congruency tasks, such as the Stroop task. Stroop-like congruency effects increase as 
the proportion of congruent trials increases (e.g., Hommel, 1994; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 
Toth et al., 1995). To explain this phenomenon, it has mostly been argued that participants 
aggregate response-related information from the irrelevant and relevant dimension, and top-
down modulate their attention to the irrelevant information depending on the proportion of 
congruent trials (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 
but see Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011). For instance, in a Stroop task with a relatively high 
proportion of congruent trials, the response associated with the task-irrelevant information 
(i.e., color words) is most often in line with the correct response. To optimize performance, 
participants could therefore strategically increase the attentional weight given to the words. 
This bias would facilitate responding on congruent trials, but heighten interference on 
incongruent trials. As such, relatively large congruency effects would be established. In 
contrast, a high proportion of incongruent trials could encourage participants to weigh 
irrelevant information to a lesser extent. This would decrease both facilitation on congruent 
trials and interference on incongruent trials, making for relatively small congruency effects.  
  In our experiment, participants performed a Sheffield lie test that either contained  
25 % or 75 % truth distractor trials. From a covert response congruency account, we expected 
that participants in the 75 % truth distractor group would assign more attentional weight to the 
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distractors compared to the 25 % truth distractor group. The 75 % truth distractor group may 
strategically increase their attention toward the distractors because distractors most often 
represent the truth. Hence, in the 75 % truth distractor condition, attending the distractors 
most often facilitates covert responding on lie trials (i.e., the initial activation of the truth) or 
overt responding on the truth trials. On the other hand, the 25 % group may shift their 
attention away from the distractors because distractors represent the lie, which complicates 
covert responding on lie trials and overt responding on truth trials. Hence, we expected to find 
larger distractor effects in the 75 % truth distractor group than in the 25 % truth distractor 
group.  
3.1. Method  
  3.1.1. Participants. Fifty-five undergraduate students at Ghent University (11 men, 
Mage = 19.04 years, SD = 2.47) took part in the experiment. In return for their participation, 
they received course credits. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
  3.1.2. Apparatus. The Sheffield lie test was presented on a Pentium IV personal 
computer with a 17-inch color monitor running Tscope (Stevens et al., 2006). Participants 
were seated approximately 50 centimeters from the screen.   
3.2. Procedure  
  Participants were tested in a dimly lit room and were randomly assigned to either the 
25 % truth distractor group (n = 28) or the 75 % truth distractor group (n = 27). As in 
Experiment 1, participants first filled out a questionnaire consisting of the questions that 
would be presented in the lie test. Response options were again yes, no or unsure. For design 
purposes, we now used 24 questions (see Appendix B). Half of them could be answered 
truthfully by a “yes” answer, and the other half by a “no” answer. When participants indicated 
they were unsure (< 1 %), or gave an unexpected answer (< 1 %), we removed their 
behavioral responses to these particular questions in the Sheffield lie test (1.83 % data loss).  
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  Participants first performed 12 practice trials without distractors, followed by 8 
practice trials with lie or truth distractors. Next, 384 test trials were presented. In contrast with 
Experiment 1, neutral distractor trials were no longer displayed. In the 25 % truth distractor 
group, truth distractors were presented on 25 % of the trials, and lie distractors on the 
remaining 75 % of the trials. Conversely, in the 75 % truth distractor group, the distractors 
represented the truth response on 75 % of the trials, and the lie response on 25 % of the trials. 
Other task characteristics were the same as in Experiment 1.   
3.3. Results  
  Trials without response within the 3 s deadline (5.37 %) and response latencies below 
300 ms (0.18 %) were discarded. Six participants were excluded from the analysis: (1) two 
participants because they used the wrong response keys during the task, (2) three participants 
because of a programming error, and (3) one participant who had an exceedingly high 
proportion of trials without response (29.69 %). Eventually, 24 participants remained in the 
25 % truth distractor group and 25 participants in the 75 % truth distractor group. Groups did 
not differ for age, t < 1, or gender, 2(1, N = 49) = 1.08, p = .30. On both error rates and 
reaction times, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA with Deception (Truth vs. Lie) and 
Distractor (Truth distractor vs. Lie distractor) as within-subjects variables and Group (25 % 
truth distractor group vs. 75 % truth distractor group) as a between-subjects variable. Mean 
error rates an reaction times per trial type are presented in Table 2.  
  3.3.1. Errors. The analysis revealed significant main effects of Deception, F(1, 47) = 
56.64, p < .001, f = 1.10, and Distractor, F(1, 47) = 53.44, p < .001, f = 1.07. However, there 
was also a marginally significant Deception by Distractor interaction, F(1, 47) = 3.60, p = .06, 
f = 0.28. A follow-up analysis showed that both on lie and truth trials the distractor effect was 
significant, ps < .001, but the effect tended to be larger on lie trials. As a result, the lie effect 
was larger on lie distractor trials than on truth distractor trials, yet both were significant, ps < 
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.001. The crucial Distractor by Group interaction also proved significant, F(1, 47) = 4.91, p = 
.03, f = 0.32, showing that the distractor effects were larger in the 75 % truth distractor group 
than in the 25 % truth distractor group (yet all were significantly different from zero, ps ≤ 
.02). Other main and interaction effects were not significant, Fs < 1.    
  3.3.2. Reaction times. For the analysis of reaction times, we removed trials with 
incorrect responses (10.89 %), and truth and lie trials with reaction times that were more than 
2.5 SDs removed from each participant’s mean reaction time on truth and lie trials, 
respectively (1.64 %). The main effect of Deception, F(1, 47) = 262.52, p < .001, f = 2.36, 
revealed a significant lie effect in reaction times. The main effect of Distractor, F(1, 47) = 
23.73, p < .001, f = 0.71, was subsumed under a significant Distractor by Group interaction, 
F(1, 47) = 7.71, p < .01, f = 0.41. Like in the errors, the distractor effects in reaction times 
were larger in the 75 % truth distractor group than in the 25 % truth distractor group. Follow-
up t-tests are in line with this finding: The distractor effect was significantly different between 
groups on lie trials, t(47) = 2.46, p = .02, d = 0.70, and followed a trend on truth trials, t(47) = 
1.74, p = .09, d = 0.50. The distractor effects were not significant in the 25 % truth distractor 
group, ts ≤ 1.54 (truth telling: d = 0.31; lying: d = 0.14), whereas they were highly significant 
in the 75 % truth distractor group, ps ≤ .001 (truth telling: d = 0.90; lying: d = 0.80). Other 
main and interaction effects did not reach significance, Fs < 1.   
3.4. Discussion 
  Experiment 2 aimed to further strengthen the idea that lie construction can involve a 
two-step process by (1) replicating the distractor effects found in Experiment 1, and (2) 
validating the explanation that these distractor effects stem from covert response congruency. 
Participants performed a Sheffield lie test that either contained 25 % or 75 % truth distractor 
trials. From the hypothesis that the distractor effects on lie trials can be considered as “covert 
response congruency” effects, we expected to find proportion congruency effects as found in 
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typical response congruency tasks, such as the Stroop task. Our results indeed supported this 
hypothesis in both errors and reaction times: The distractor effects on lie trials were 
significantly larger in the 75 % truth distractor group compared to the 25 % truth distractor 
group. The reaction-time distractor effects even tripled in effect size. The presence of Stroop-
like proportion congruency effects speaks for the idea that covert response congruency 
underlies the distractor effects found on lie trials. As such, our findings confirm the 
hypothesis that constructing lies can require a first step of truth activation.  
4. General Discussion 
  Previous research holds that the higher cognitive demand of lying compared to truth 
telling is partly due to the initial activation of the dominant truth response (e.g., Christ et al., 
2009; Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010). Cognitive control would be needed to solve the 
response conflict that arises between the activated truth and the to-be-emitted lie response. 
However, we reasoned that the truth may also serve the lying process as it may be involved in 
constructing the lie. In line with this idea, self-reports have revealed that liars frequently alter 
the truth or simply say the opposite of what is true (Walczyk et al., 2003). These reports 
suggest that constructing a lie may occur via a two-step process, where the first step entails 
the activation of the truth, based upon which a deceptive response can be formulated in a 
second step. Because the accuracy of introspective self-reports on cognition can be questioned 
(e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), our study intended a more direct test of the two-step 
hypothesis of lying by applying an experimental manipulation in the Sheffield lie test, a 
reaction-time based deception test in which participants alternatingly lie and tell the truth to 
yes/no questions. Inspired by Seymour’s 1977 paper, we flanked the questions by distractors 
that either represented the truth or lie response.  
 Experiment 1 showed that lying was faster and more accurate when the questions were 
flanked by truth distractors compared to lie distractors. In line with the two-step hypothesis of 
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Table 2  
Mean error rates and reaction times in the Sheffield lie test of Experiment 2  
 
 
 
 
 
a,b
 Different letters in the same row indicate that the values are significantly different (p < .05)  
        
 
25 % truth distractor group  
 
 75 % truth distractor group  
 
Truth distractor (TD) 
M (SD) 
Lie distractor (LD) 
M (SD) 
Distractor effect  
(LD – TD) 
M (SD) 
 
Truth distractor (TD) 
M (SD) 
Lie distractor (LD) 
M (SD) 
Distractor effect  
(LD – TD) 
M (SD) 
Error rates (%)    
 
   
     Truth telling 6.45 (4.65) 8.91 (5.45) 2.46 (4.68) a 
 
6.12 (4.42) 10.38 (7.50) 4.26 (4.51) b 
     Lying 11.38 (6.83) 14.89 (7.59) 3.51 (4.79) a 
 
10.57 (7.77) 17.47 (8.71) 6.90 (6.93) b 
     Lie effect (lie – truth) 4.93 (6.53) 5.98 (6.26)  
 
4.45 (5.51) 7.09 (6.59)  
Reaction times (ms)    
    
     Truth telling 1254 (230) 1280 (204) 26 (83) a 
 
1200 (156) 1265 (183) 65 (72) b 
     Lying 1480 (247) 1491 (242) 11 (80) a 
 
1437 (193) 1508 (203) 71 (89) b 
     Lie effect (lie – truth) 226 (141) 211 (92)  
 
237 (100) 243 (111)  
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lie construction, these distractor effects can be interpreted as “covert congruency” effects. 
Truth distractors would be congruent and lie distractors incongruent with the covert truth 
response that is activated in the first step. Relative to lie distractors, truth distractors would 
thus facilitate the truth activation and help forward the construction of the lie in the second 
step. To reinforce the idea that the distractor effects can be explained by covert response 
congruency, Experiment 2 manipulated the proportion of truth distractors. We predicted that a 
high proportion of truth distractor trials would stimulate participants to strategically increase 
their attention toward the distractors and/or a high proportion of lie distractor trials would 
encourage participants to shift their attention away from the distractors. More attention for 
distractors may facilitate the first step of the two-step process on lie trials with truth 
distractors and/or amplify interference on this first step on lie trials with lie distractors, 
thereby establishing relatively large distractor effects. In keeping with this hypothesis, we 
found that the group who performed a Sheffield lie test that consisted of 75 % truth distractor 
trials exhibited larger distractor effects on lie trials than the group who executed the test with 
only 25 % truth distractor trials.
 In line with previous research, our study supports the idea that the truth is activated 
during lying. However, in contrast to most previous studies that implied from this finding that 
the truth hampers lying (e.g., Spence et al., 2004; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004), our 
findings demonstrate that the truth may as well be functional in lying in that it can constitute 
an integral element of the construction of the lie. As such, our study adds to previous self-
report findings (Walczyk et al., 2003) by providing more direct support for the idea that the 
truth can be useful in the lying process. Our findings validate the notions of the Activation-
Decision-Construction-Action Theory (Walczyk et al., 2014) and Working Model of 
Deception (Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005) that point to the truth’s usefulness in the 
act of lying. However, whereas these models advance the helpful nature of the truth in a rather 
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non-explicit manner, and in the shadow of the conflict hypothesis, our study explicitly put 
forward the idea that the truth forms a first step in the construction of lies. The two-step 
hypothesis also clarifies the role of working memory updating and shifting in lying, as it gives 
a rationale why constructing a lie would require to maintain both the truth and lie response in 
working memory, and to shift between the mental sets associated with these responses. 
 We note that we also found distractor effects on trials on which participants told the 
truth. These effects showed that truth telling was more easy in the presence of truth distractors 
compared to lie distractors. This finding conforms to the idea that generating the truth only 
entails a single step, which is the mere activation of the truth response. Truth distractors are 
then congruent and lie distractors incongruent with the overt truth response. The fact that 
generating the truth would only entail one step, whereas constructing a lie would involve two 
steps, suggests that the cognitive cost of lying may be partly attributed to the extra step.  
 Our findings call for a shift in theoretical thinking on deception that not only 
highlights the interfering, but also the functional features of the truth activation in the act of 
lying. In that respect, one may wonder how our proposed two-step process could be modeled 
within a dynamical framework in which the truth and lie response compete. First, our findings 
suggest that the selection of the truth in Step 1 is influenced by the automatic processing of 
distractors. In other words, the decision at Step 1 could automatically be facilitated by truth 
distractors and/or inhibited by lie distractors. Given that cognitive and motor stages 
continuously blend into each other (see Song & Nakayama, 2009, for an overview of 
dynamical models on decision making), effects of the covert truth activation and distractors 
would leak into this final motor output. From a dynamical perspective, we do not exclude that 
the temporal window of the two stages may overlap to some extent such that processes 
operating at Step 1 might feed forward to Step 2 even before Step 1 has been finalized. 
However, if we observe that truth distractors facilitate the selection of lie responses relative to 
LYING RELIES ON THE TRUTH   24 
 
lie distractors, this would strongly suggest that the selection of the lie response involves an 
initial step of truth retrieval.  
  Second, based on dynamical models on decision making (Song & Nakayama, 2009), 
every step of response selection within the two-step process may involve a parallel 
competition between response options, in our case the response options being the truth and lie 
response. Because the lie would not yet be formulated in the first step of our proposed lying 
process, the lie response option may here represent the goal to execute a lie response. We 
assume that after the lie response has been constructed in the second step and needs to be 
executed, the truth response would no longer be functional and give rise to actual response 
conflict with the to-be-emitted lie. One important issue that future research should elucidate is 
the relative impact of the functional and interfering effect of the truth activation on lying 
proficiency. It is possible that the conflicting aspect of the truth activation impacts more 
heavily on lying proficiency than its functional facet. This would imply that lying in the 
presence of truth distractors would be less efficient (though still more efficient than in the 
presence of lie distractors) compared to lying in an appropriate baseline condition. A few 
findings are in line with the idea that the conflict-inducing effect of the truth activation would 
overpower its functional effect. Walcyzk and colleagues (2005), for example, found that being 
better able to access the truthful memory of an episodic event due to its recency increased the 
reaction-time lie effect compared to lying about less recent events. Furthermore, Farrow and 
co-workers showed that participants with better verbal working memory updating skills 
displayed larger reaction-time lie effects as a result of faster truth telling, but slower deceptive 
responding compared to participants with less efficient updating skills (Farrow, Hopwood, 
Parks, Hunter, & Spence, 2010). The authors reasoned that those with better updating skills 
retrieved more strongly the truth, which caused more response conflict and complicated its 
inhibition during deception.  
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  To get a better picture of the temporal characteristics of the two-step process involved 
in lying, future research may manipulate the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the 
question and the distractor. One could expect that with increasing SOAs, distractors would no 
longer affect the first “truth” step, but interact with the second “lie” step. As a result, “overt 
congruency” effects would be established. Manipulating the SOA could reveal when the 
“covert congruency” effects turn into “overt congruency” effects, and as such give an 
indication at which point the truth loses its functional character and starts to interfere. 
  It is important to realize that we investigated the two-step hypothesis of lie 
construction in the specific context where participants were instructed to lie to fairly untrained 
yes/no questions. One should therefore be careful in generalizing our findings to lying in other 
situations. As self-reports have revealed, lying to yes/no questions often happens by applying 
the simple rule “say the opposite of what is true” (Walczyk et al., 2003). In that case, the lie 
response is highly related to the truth. Future research should investigate whether a two-step 
process of lie construction also applies to open-ended questions, where the link between the 
truth and the lie is often less obvious. Self-reports do show that the truth is also used when 
lying to open-ended questions (Walczyk et al., 2003), but additional experimental research on 
this issue seems warranted. Although our participants lied several times to the same questions, 
we cannot speak of extended lie training (e.g., Van Bockstaele et al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 
2011). It is possible that lying does no longer involve a two-step process when a lie has been 
extensively practiced. The strong association between the question and the lie response may 
then lead to the immediate retrieval of the lie, without the requirement of the intermediate 
“truth” step. When this hypothesis proves true, one could expect to find “overt congruency” 
effects, where lie distractors would be more helpful than truth distractors when lying.   
  Our study investigated lying from the definition that all forms of deception eventually 
require a response that is incompatible with the truth (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004). We 
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acknowledge, though, that our questions are not the kind of questions people usually lie to in 
real life. However, it was a well-considered choice to examine the effect of distractors in a 
restricted design using these simple, fairly neutral questions. From this approach, we were 
able to exclude possible effects of factors that may be at play when people lie in real life, such 
as emotions or motivation. Having found the “basic” distractor effect, we can now 
systematically investigate the effects of these factors in more real-life settings.  
 Our research contributes not only to the theoretical understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying deception, but also provides a possible means to detect deception. In an 
interrogation context, a suspect could be presented with a “Did you do it?”-like question. The 
examinee is expected to provide an overt “no” answer – whether guilty or not (as an 
affirmative response implies confessing crime enactment). Interestingly, this overt “no” 
answer involves the truth for innocents, but a lie for guilty suspects. One could be tempted to 
infer deception simply from the response latencies to the did-you-do-it question. However, 
such inference would necessarily be based upon a between-subjects comparison, that (1) 
requires a database of how fast innocents respond, and even more problematic (2) is biased by 
individual differences in general response speed. The use of distractors circumvents these 
problems, as it allows to infer deception from a within-subjects comparison of how truth 
versus lie distractors influence performance. When denying the did-you-do-it question, our 
findings suggests that “yes” and “no” distractors will differentially impact upon the overt “no” 
response in guilty versus innocent examinees. For guilty suspects, “yes” distractors (the 
covert truth) should facilitate responding compared to “no” distractors. The opposite pattern is 
expected in innocent suspects, where the “no” distractors (the covert truth) should facilitate 
responding compared to “yes” distractors. Therefore, rather than the response to the question 
per se, the manner in which performance to the question is influenced by “yes” and “no” 
distractors, could bring guilt to light.   
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Footnotes
  1
 Our two-step hypothesis should be distinguished from the concept of “truth bias” 
(Gilbert, 1991; Spinoza, 1677/1982). Truth bias is the phenomenon that people have the 
tendency to verify incoming information as true. An extra step would then be required to 
falsify this initial belief if it is not in line with the actual truth. The idea of “truth bias” has 
been supported in studies using verification tasks, by showing that participants are faster to 
verify that a proposition is true than to verify it is false (Clark & Chase, 1972; Gilbert, Krull, 
Malone, 1990). Whereas the concept of truth bias refers to how information is understood by 
the receiver (i.e., initial default assumption is that information is true), the two-step 
hypothesis of lying deals with how deceptive information is conveyed by the sender (i.e., first 
determine the truth in order to afterwards communicate the lie). 
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Appendix A 
Questions used in Experiment 1 
 
 
Questions that required a truthful  
“yes” response* 
 
 
Questions that required a truthful  
“no” response 
 
 
Are you a student? 
Are you a human? 
Are you inside? 
Are you a man? 
Are you a participant? 
Are you a person? 
Are you alive? 
Are you a boy? 
Are you a citizen? 
Are you an adult? 
 
Are you a professor? 
Are you an animal? 
Are you outside? 
Are you a woman? 
Are you an experimenter? 
Are you an object? 
Are you dead? 
Are you a girl? 
Are you a soldier? 
Are you a toddler?  
 
 
 
Note: *For female participants, the questions including the target words “man”, “woman”, 
“boy”, and “girl” required the opposite response as indicated in the table.  
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Appendix B 
Questions used in Experiment 2 
 
 
Questions that required a truthful  
“yes” response* 
 
 
Questions that required a truthful  
“no” response 
 
 
Are you a student? 
Are you a human? 
Are you inside? 
Are you a man? 
Are you a participant? 
Are you a person? 
Are you alive? 
Are you a son? 
Are you a citizen? 
Are you an adult? 
Are you European? 
Are you white? 
 
Are you a professor? 
Are you an animal? 
Are you outside? 
Are you a woman? 
Are you an experimenter? 
Are you an object? 
Are you dead? 
Are you a daughter? 
Are you a soldier? 
Are you a toddler?  
Are you Asian? 
Are you black? 
 
 
 
Note: *For female participants, the questions including the target words “man” and “woman” 
required the opposite response as indicated in the table.  
 
 
 
 
 
